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Pomegranates and Railroads: Why POM
Wonderful Suggests that the Federal
Railroad Safety Act Should Never Preclude
Federal Employers Liability Act Claims
Dominic G. Biffignani*

I. INTRODUCTION
On September 30, 2010, Scott Schendel was the engineer on a
locomotive heading southbound near Two Harbors, Minnesota.1 His shift
started early that morning – he clocked in at 4:30 a.m. – and the railroad
wanted to make sure Schendel’s locomotive returned to Two Harbors
before his mandatory twelve-hour on-duty time limit expired.2 At 4:05
p.m., however, disaster struck: Schendel’s locomotive collided with a
northbound train, causing catastrophic damage.3 Three locomotives and
fourteen rail cars derailed, resulting in $8.1 million in damages to railroad
property.4

*

B.A., Saint Louis University, 2018; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School
of Law, 2022; Senior Lead Articles Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2021–2022;
Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2020–2021. I would like to thank Professor
Thomas Bennett for sharing his immense knowledge of state and federal courts and
for his continued mentorship during the writing of this note, as well as members of
Missouri Law Review for their help in the editing process. I would also like to thank
FELA practitioners Jerry Schlichter, Nelson Wolff ‘92, and Scott Gershenson, as well
as legal administrator Sheri O’Gorman, whose zealous advocacy for injured railroad
workers inspired me to write this note.
1. Schendel v. Duluth, No. 69DUCV132319, 2014 WL 5365131, at *1 (D.
Minn. Sept. 29, 2014).
2. Id. Here, defendant Duluth moved for summary judgment against Schendel.
Id. Therefore, the District Court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to
Schendel while ruling on the motion. Id. at *2.
3. Id. at *1–2.
4. NTSB: Crew Error Caused 2010 Train Crash North of Two Harbors,
DULUTH
NEWS
TRIB.
(Feb.
13,
2013),
https://www.duluthnewstribune.com/business/transportation/2332255-ntsb-crewerror-caused-2010-train-crash-north-two-harbors [https://perma.cc/W5QL-WF9Q].
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Schendel’s injuries were significant and lead to an extended stay at a
local hospital.5 To redress them, he sued his employer for negligence
under the Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”), which gives railroad
employees a federal cause of action in tort for injuries caused by their
employers.6 Despite this statutory cause of action, the Sixth Judicial
District Court of Minnesota found that part of Schendel’s FELA claim was
precluded by the Federal Railroad Safety Act (“FRSA”), which allows the
Federal Railroad Administration (“FRA”), but not private individuals, to
set and enforce general railroad safety standards.7 Thus, Schendel was
barred from presenting to a jury several theories of his employer’s
negligence.8
Schendel is one of dozens of railroad employees denied recovery on
the theory of FRSA preclusion. Unlike other occupations, railroad
employees are generally not covered under state worker’s compensation
statutes.9 Instead, their sole form of recovery is an action under FELA.10
When plaintiffs are precluded from bringing FELA claims, they lose their
only method of compensation for injuries sustained as a result of their
employers’ negligence.11
As the United States Supreme Court recently emphasized,
congressional intent is the touchstone of proper conflict analysis between
two federal statutes, and a close examination of the history of these two
statutes reveals that Congress never intended FRSA to preclude FELA
claims.12 Analyzed through the lens of congressional intent, the conflict
between FELA and FRSA disappears, as several lower courts have
recently recognized.13 Yet more broadly, lower state and federal courts
remain severely divided on the question of FRSA preclusion.14 Courts
should heed the Supreme Court’s recent guidance to follow congressional
5. 1 Still Hospitalized After Train Crash Near Two Harbors, TWINCITIES.COM
(Oct. 4, 2010), https://www.twincities.com/2010/10/04/1-still-hospitalized-aftertrain-crash-near-two-harbors/ [https://perma.cc/R8UQ-M4ZN] (last updated Nov. 12,
2015).
6. Schendel, No. 69DUCV132319, 2014 WL 5365131, at *1–2.
7. Id. at *4.
8. Id.
9. 45 U.S.C. § 51; Lund v. San Joaquin Valley R.R., 71 P.3d 770, 776 (Ca.
2003) (noting that some permanently injured railroad workers can receive quasiworkers compensation benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act).
10. Earwood v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 845 F. Supp. 880, 885 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (citing
Wabash R.R. Co. v. Hayes, 234 U.S. 86, 89 (1914)).
11. Myers v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 753 N.E.2d 560, 561 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (citing
Isbell v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 745 N.E.2d 53, 61 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)).
12. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1624 (2018) (quoting Morton
v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)); POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 573
U.S. 102, 111–13 (2014).
13. See infra note 151.
14. Id.
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intent above all else and allow FELA plaintiffs, like Schendel, to maintain
negligence claims against their employers, notwithstanding FRSA.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part II gives a brief history of
FELA and FRSA, a summary of the doctrines of preemption and
preclusion, and a summary of the genesis of the FRSA preclusion
argument in federal and state courts. It concludes with a detailed analysis
of the federal circuit court precedent which established FRSA preclusion
over FELA claims for more than a decade. Part III provides an in-depth
analysis of POM Wonderful v. Coca-Cola Co., which established a novel
framework to resolve conflicts between two federal statutes or regulations.
Part III also sets out a litany of post-POM cases that highlight lower courts’
changed approach to analyzing FRSA’s preclusive effect on FELA claims.
Finally, Part IV evaluates the continued viability of FRSA preclusion in
POM’s wake, as well as continued conflict regarding the preclusion issue
in three federal circuits.

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. FELA
Congress enacted FELA in 1908 to address the fact that, “throughout
the 1870’s, 80’s, and 90’s, thousands of railroad workers were being killed
and tens of thousands were being maimed annually in what increasingly
came to be seen as a national tragedy, if not a national scandal.”15
Congress intended FELA to reduce injuries and death resulting from
accidents on interstate railroads by “shift[ing] part of the ‘human
overhead’ of doing business from employees to their employers.”16
Generally, FELA serves as railroad employees’ sole remedy to recover for
injuries sustained as a result of an employer’s negligence.17
FELA allows injured employees of any “common carrier by railroad”
to recover against the railroad on a theory of negligence.18 FELA grants
concurrent jurisdiction to both state and federal courts.19 Though FELA is
a federal statute, its cause of action sounds in the theory of common-law

15. DeHahn v. CSX Transp., Inc., 925 N.E.2d 442, 446 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)
(quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Miller, 858 A.2d 1025, 1029 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2004)); 45 U.S.C. § 51; see Joseph M. Miller, Federal Preemption and Preclusion:
Why the Federal Railroad Safety Act Should Not Preclude the Federal Employer’s
Liability Act, 51 LOY. L. REV. 947, 952 (2005).
16. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542 (1994).
17. Earwood v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 845 F. Supp. 880, 885 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (citing
Wabash R.R. Co. v. Hayes, 234 U.S. 86 (1914)).
18. 45 U.S.C. § 51.
19. 45 U.S.C. § 56.
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negligence.20 Therefore, plaintiffs “must offer evidence proving the
common law elements of negligence, including duty, breach,
foreseeability, and causation.”21 The scope of the railroads’ liability
extends to the negligence “of any of the officers, agents, or employees of
such carrier” or negligence resulting from “defect or insufficiency… in its
cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats,
wharves, or other equipment.”22
In light of FELA’s “humanitarian” purposes, courts have construed
FELA liberally.23 As such, courts apply a relaxed standard of causation to
FELA claims,24 requiring only proof that “employer negligence played any
part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages
are sought.”25 In other words, FELA uses a pure comparative fault
standard to measure negligence.26 Additionally, subsequent amendments
to the 1908 act abolished common-law tort defenses such as assumption
of risk, the fellow-servant rule, and contributory negligence.27
Furthermore, FELA claims arising out of violations of other, related
statutes (such as the Federal Safety Appliance Act and Locomotive
Inspection Act) hold the railroad strictly liable for injuries, such that an
employee’s contributory negligence cannot be used to diminish their
recovery.28 Subsequent amendments also prohibited FELA claims from
20. Id.; Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 165–66 (2007) (first citing
Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Stapleton, 279 U.S. 587, 590 (1929); and then citing
Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 182 (1949)).
21. DeHahn v. CSX Transp., Inc., 925 N.E.2d 442, 446–47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)
(citing Williams v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 161 F.3d 1059, 1062 (7th Cir. 1998)).
22. 45 U.S.C. § 51.
23. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542–43 (1994).
24. Id. at 543 (citing Rogers v. Mo. Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957)).
25. Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957) (emphasis added); see
CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 700 (2011) (quoting Coray v. S. Pac.
Co., 335 U.S. 520, 524 (1949) (“Under FELA, injury ‘is proximately caused’ by the
railroad’s negligence if that negligence ‘played any part … in … causing the injury.”).
26. Under a pure comparative fault standard, a plaintiff may recover damages
may recover damages even if they are 99% responsible for the total negligence in a
given case. 3 ALFRED W. GANS ET AL., AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 13:8 (Mar. 2021
update); see also 45 U.S.C. § 53 (“[T]he fact that the employee may have been guilty
of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be
diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such
employee”); Norfolk S. Ry. Co v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 171 (2007) (holding that same
standard of causation applies to railroad negligence as to plaintiff contributory
negligence).
27. Consol. Rail Corp., 512 U.S. at 542–43; 45 U.S.C. §§ 51, 53–55. The general
tenor of these defenses was that a railroad employee, by nature of his contract of
employment, assumed the risk of injuries resulting from his negligence or the
negligence of his fellow employees. See GANS ET AL., supra note 26, at § 13:8.
28. See, e.g., Wright v. Ark. & Mo. R.R. Co., 574 F.3d 612, 620 (8th Cir. 2009)
(Locomotive Inspection Act); Grogg v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 841 F.2d 210, 212 (8th Cir.
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being waived by contract.29 Similarly, FELA claims are generally not
arbitrable.30
In sum, Congress intended FELA to have a broad scope in order to
redress an increasing number of injuries sustained by railroad workers as
the railroad industry expanded.31 Courts have consistently construed
FELA liberally in light of this remedial goal to allow railroad workers to
bring causes of action under a pure comparative fault standard, thus
maximizing the chances of recovery for injured employees.32 Courts have
further held that FELA should not be cut down by judicial inference or
implication, citing Congress’s remedial purposes.33 As one court aptly put
it, “In the wake of this juggernaut of language, consistently iterated and
reiterated over the course of seven and one-half decades, it is not hard to
figure out who wins the ties and who gets the benefits of the close calls”
in FELA cases.34

B. The Federal Railroad Safety Act
The FRSA was enacted in 1970 to enhance railroad safety and reduce
rail-related accidents.35 Concerned with a steady increase in the number of
said accidents over a decade-long period and increased scrutiny from
1988) (Federal Safety Appliance Act). In order to reap the benefits of a FELA strict
liability claim arising out of LIA or FSAA, the locomotive or railcar at question must
be “in use.” See, e.g., Brady v. Terminial R. Ass’n of St. Louis, 303 U.S. 10, 12–13
(1938). The “in use” question has garnered significant debate over the past thirty years
and could be decided by the United States Supreme Court relatively soon. See Ledure
v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 209 L. Ed. 2d 747 (May 17, 2021) (SCOTUS calling for views
of the solicitor general on the “in use” question). For a detailed summary of the
conflict and an argument for why “in use” should be interpreted broadly within the
LIA and FSAA, see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ledure v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.
(No. 20-807), 2020 WL 7356624 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2020).
29. Consol. Rail Corp., 512 U.S. at 542–43; 45 U.S.C. §§ 51, 53–55.
30. Some injuries compensable under the FELA are also compensable under the
Railway Labor Act’s arbitration scheme. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 564–67 (1987). The Supreme Court has held the fact that a
claimant’s injury is compensable under the RLA’s arbitration scheme does not
preclude a claimant from bringing an FELA claim. Id. (“The fact that an injury
otherwise compensable under the FELA was caused by conduct that may have been
subject to arbitration under the RLA does not deprive an employee of his opportunity
to bring an FELA action for damages”).
31. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 561–62 (1987).
32. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 145 (2003); Consol. Rail
Corp., 512 U.S. at 543.
33. Madden v. Anton Antonov & AV Transportation, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 3d 1011,
1021–22 (D. Neb. 2015) (citing Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 189 (1949);
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 480 U.S. at 562.
34. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Miller, 858 A.2d 1025, 1038 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004).
35. 49 U.S.C. § 20101.
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media outlets, Congress held hearings on the need for a uniform regulatory
framework for track, roadbed, and equipment safety.36 Congress’s initial
inquiries into the overhaul of then-current railroad safety regulations were
met with stark opposition from railroad management, labor unions, and
state regulatory authorities.37 The Secretary of Transportation – in an effort
to curb criticism from these powerful and politically influential actors –
appointed a Rail Safety Task Force in 1969, which concluded that track,
roadbed, and equipment defects were equally as responsible for train
accidents as was human error.38 Additionally, the Task Force concluded
existing federal and state regulations did not provide adequate safety
standards.39 The Task Force recommended that “broad federal regulatory
authority over all areas of railroad safety be enacted”;40 Congress
agreed.41
FRSA empowers the Secretary of Transportation to “prescribe
regulations and issue orders for every area of railroad safety.”42 In turn,
the Secretary acts through the FRA to promulgate regulations regarding
railroad safety.43 The FRA was established by the Department of

36. The Federal Railroad Administration–Lobbyist Participation in Drafting, 21
CATH. U. L. REV. 747, 748–49 (1972) (“There is no information in the FRA’s files
during this period relative to the causes of the accident increase or on the introduction
of rail safety legislation. The interviewers asked spokesmen for the FRA whether there
was activity that was not reflected in the files. The responses varied. Some stated
vaguely that ‘there were on-going discussions on the methods of improving rail
safety.’ Specifics, however, could not be given. Others stated frankly that the FRA did
not have the muscle to initiate the type of broad-based safety bill that was necessary
to adequately attack the problem.”); H.R. REP. NO. 91-1194 at 4108 (1970).
37. The Federal Railroad Administration–Lobbyist Participation in Drafting,
supra note 36, at 750–52.
38. The task force’s membership consisted of DOT representatives, FRA
representatives, and several members of respected lobbying groups. Id. at 753. “[The
establishment of the task force] recognized the necessity for the Department [of
Transportation] to establish its neutrality. The three groups—labor, management, and
state regulatory authorities—had too much influence, both in DOT and Congress, for
any one side to trust the matter to an early and open committee hearing.” Id.; H.R.
REP. NO. 91-1194 at 4108.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. The House and Senate agreed to the Conference Report on the bill (S.1933)
on Sept. 28, 1970. The Federal Railroad Administration–Lobbyist Participation in
Drafting, 21 CATH. U. L. REV. 747, 765 (1972). On Oct. 7, President Nixon signed the
bill into law. Id.
42. 49 U.S.C. § 20103(a).
43. 49 U.S.C. §§ 103, 20103(a).
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Transportation Act of 1966.44 The FRA has, and continues to employ, an
informal rulemaking framework to draft these regulations.45
Violating FRA regulations can result in a civil penalty, an injunction,
or other appropriate action recommended by the Secretary.46 Additionally,
the Secretary can order compliance with a violated railroad safety
regulation or prohibit an individual from performing safety-sensitive
functions.47 At the request of the Secretary, the Attorney General of the
United States may bring an action in a United States District Court to use
the above mechanisms of enforcement.48
As with other regulatory agencies, the FRA has experienced intense
scrutiny due to concerns regarding industry influence.49 While the history
of the railroad industry and the Interstate Commerce Commission
(“ICC”)50 suggest industry influence is inevitable, new literature suggests
that the railroad industry’s power to obtain desired outcomes by shaping
the FRA’s rule-making process is far from conclusive.51 Yet, concerns of
44. About FRA, FED. RAILROAD ADMIN., https://railroads.dot.gov/aboutfra/about-fra (last updated Oct. 7, 2019). The FRA is one of ten regulatory agencies
within the Department of Transportation concerned with intermodal transport. Id.
45. Rulemaking
Process,
U.S.
DEPT.
OF
TRANSP.,
https://www.transportation.gov/regulations/rulemaking-process (last updated Apr. 5,
2021). First, the FRA issues a notice of proposed rulemaking (“NPRM”) to publicize
the proposed regulation. Id. After the NPRM is published in the Federal Register and
public docket, the FRA is required to allow a period for public comment (usually 60
days). Id. After the public comment period closes, the FRA reviews the comments
received and decides whether to proceed with the proposed regulation or not. Id. If the
FRA decides to proceed, the finalized version of the regulation is published in the
Federal Register or personally served to those affected by the regulation. Id.
Additionally, a final version of the regulation (along with copies of any finalized
documents relating to the regulation) will be published in the public docket. Id.
Generally, a finalized regulation “cannot be made effective in less than 30 days after
publication.” Id. The Office of the Federal Register will add the finalized regulation
to the Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”) on a rolling basis “to reflect the additions,
changes, or rescissions” made by the regulation. Id.
46. 49 U.S.C. § 20111(a).
47. 49 U.S.C. § 20111(b)–(c).
48. 49 U.S.C. § 20112(a).
49. See Hannah J. Wiseman, Negotiated Rulemaking and New Risks: A Rail
Safety Case Study, 7 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 207, 215–17 (2017).
50. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the
Railroads, and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467, 473–505 (1952) (arguing that
the ICC’s reliance on the railroad industry to maintain viability and expand its power
in the post-World War I era led to a number of concessions to the rail industry in the
areas of rates and fares, monopoly and antitrust allegations, rail-motor competition,
and rail-water competition).
51. See Gabriel Scheffler, Failure to Capture: Why Business Does Not Control
the Rulemaking Process, 79 MD. L. REV. 700, 760–66 (2020) (analyzing the
formulation of the Tank Car Rule and the railroad industry’s ability to achieve desired
policy goals in regard to the rule).
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inadequate resources and input from the railroad industry in the FRA’s
rule-making process continue to fuel accusations that the agency has been
captured by the railroads and their supportive special interest groups.52
FRSA contains an express preemption provision that provides in
pertinent part: “A state may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation,
or order related to railroad safety or security until the Secretary of
Transportation (with respect to railroad safety matters) . . . prescribes a
regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State
requirement.”53 This provision enables the Secretary of Transportation
(and their servient regulatory agencies) to assume the responsibility of
creating uniform railroad safety regulations. Once the Secretary of
Transportation enacts a regulation that “covers” an area of railroad safety,
any corresponding state law or regulation is displaced.54
To better understand the impact of FRSA’s express preemption
provision and federal courts’ application of the provision to preclude
FELA claims, an explanation of the distinctions between preemption and
preclusion is merited.

C. Federal Preemption and Preclusion
Federal preemption and preclusion are related doctrines that allow
claims to be barred in certain situations.55 Preemption is the principle that
a federal law can supersede or supplant any inconsistent state law or
regulation.56 The doctrine of federal preemption is rooted in the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which mandates that federal
law remain “the supreme law of the land.”57 The Supreme Court has
52. THOMAS MCGARITY ET AL., CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, CENTER
FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM WHITE PAPER #910: THE TRUTH ABOUT TORTS:
REGULATORY PREEMPTION AT THE FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION 9–15 (2009)
http://208.112.41.213/articles/RailroadPreemption910.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DDM3GAC] (arguing that evidence of FRA inspections only covering 2% of railroads’
operations each year and investigating only 13% of serious crossing collisions,
combined with the exodus of high-level FRA officials from the agency to companies
they once regulated is evidence of agency capture).
53. 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(2).
54. Id.
55. See Res Judicata, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Preemption
(5), BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2011).
56. Preemption (5), BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
57. Thomas H. Sosnowski, Narrowing the Field: The Case Against Implied Field
Preemption of State Product Liability Law, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2286, 2294 (2013)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 1); see also CSX. Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood,
507 U.S. 658, 663 (1993) (citing U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl.2; Maryland v. Louisiana, 451
U.S. 725, 746 (1981)) (“Where a state statute conflicts with, or frustrates, federal law,
the former must give way”), superseded on other grounds by statute, Implementing
the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-52, 121
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constructed two maxims to guide lower courts in any preemption analysis:
(1) Congressional intent and (2) the “presumption against preemption.”58
These maxims direct any court conducting a preemption analysis to
determine the congressional intent behind the federal statute at issue and
defer to state law in fields the states have traditionally occupied, “unless
the ‘clear and manifest purpose of Congress’ requires it.”59
There are generally two types of preemption: express and implied. 60
Applying the concept of express preemption is relatively undemanding. If
a federal statute or federal agency regulation includes a provision
explicitly displacing state law, a court determines whether the state law at
issue falls within the scope of the provision.61 If there is no express
preemption provision, or the state law at issue is determined to fall outside
the scope of the provision, courts will turn to the concept of implied
preemption.62 Implied preemption is further subdivided into implied
“conflict” preemption and implied “field” preemption.63 If a court
determines that any form of preemption applies in a dispute, the claimant
is barred from asserting the state-law claim.64
Preclusion, in the context of statutory conflict analysis, is the
principle that, where two statutes conflict with one another and neither can
be given its full effect, one statute must override the other and thus bar
claims brought under the overridden statute.65 The doctrine of preclusion
applies to any two state statutes or any two federal statutes.66 Therefore –
unlike preemption – issues of preclusion do not upset the state-federal
balance.67
Nevertheless, preemption principles are instructive to
Stat. 266, as recognized in Rhinehart v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 10-CV-86(LJV)
(LGF), 2017 WL 3500018 (Aug. 16, 2017).
58. Sosnowski, supra note 57, at 2296–97.
59. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
60. Sosnowski, supra note 57, at 2288.
61. Id. at 2294–95. In order to determine the scope of an express preemption
provision, courts employ “conventional tools of statutory interpretation.” Id. at 2295.
62. Id.
63. Id. While not salient to the current analysis, implied conflict preemption can
occur when either it is impossible for a party to comply with the federal law and state
law at issue simultaneously, or where the state law “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Id. at
2295. Implied field preemption occurs when a court “defines a field in which all state
law claims are invalidated, rather than conduct a conflict analysis.” Id. at 2296.
64. See id. at 2294.
65. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1624 (2018); POM Wonderful,
L.L.C. v. Coca-Cola Co., 679 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d, POM Wonderful
L.L.C. v. Coca-Cola Co., 573 U.S. 102, 121 (2014); WILLIAM M. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 281–82 (2d ed. 2006).
66. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL, supra note 65, at 282–83.
67. POM Wonderful, 573 U.S. at 111.
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preclusion cases “insofar as they are designed to assess the interaction of
laws that bear on the same subject.”68
In dealing with federal statutory conflicts, the Supreme Court has
expressed that it “must strive to give effect to both” statutes in question.69
Additionally, a party arguing that two statutes are incapable of being
harmonized bears the burden of showing “a clearly expressed
congressional intention” that one should override the other.70
Furthermore, the Supreme Court applies canons of construction to
resolve conflicts between federal statutes.71 One of these canons is the
“presumption against repeals by implication,” which rests on the theory
that “Congress will specifically address pre-existing law when it wishes to
suspend operations in a later statute.”72 Another canon the Court applies
is the “primacy of the last enacted statute.”73 This canon rests on the theory
that subsequent amendments to one statute can change interpretation of
other statutes not formally or recently amended.74 Finally, a third canon
commonly invoked in federal statutory conflict is the rule that “the specific
statute controls the general.”75 This canon rests on the theory that, when
resolving a conflict between two statutes, courts should give priority to the
statute that deals more specifically with the issue at hand because it
denotes Congress’ deliberation and specific intent on said issue.76

68. Id. at 111–12.
69. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1624 (2018) (quoting Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)) (internal quotations omitted).
70. Id. (quoting Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S.
528, 533 (1995)).
71. See ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL, supra note 65, at 281.
72. Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1624 (quoting United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S.
439, 452 (1988)).
73. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL, supra note 65, at 282.
74. Id. at 282–83; see Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1024 (1984) (Brennan,
J., with Marshall, J. and Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[C]onflicting statutes should be
interpreted so as to give effect to each but to allow a later enacted, more specific statute
to amend an earlier, more general statute only to the extent of the repugnancy between
the two statutes.”), superseded by statute, Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796; see, e.g., Sorenson v. Sec’y of Treasury, 475
U.S. 851, 863–65 (1986) (giving deference to the 1981 Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act intercepting of “overpayments” that would be credited to lowincome families under the 1975 Earned Income Credit Program).
75. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL, supra note 65, at 283–84.
76. Id.; see Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550–51 (1974) (“Where there is no
clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a
general one, regardless of the priority of enactment.”).
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D. Easterwood: The Beginning of the FRSA Preemption/Preclusion
Analysis
FRSA’s express preemption provision, which displaced
corresponding state law claims that were covered by FRSA regulations,
provided the foundation for early decisions holding that FELA claims
could be precluded by the same regulations.77 The catalyst for the
preclusion argument – although FELA was not implicated in the case –
was CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood.78 In Easterwood, the United States
Supreme Court applied FRSA’s express preemption provision to block a
state-law wrongful death claim brought in a diversity action.79 The
plaintiff argued that defendant CSX Transportation was, among other
things, negligent for operating a train at an excessive speed.80 In turn, CSX
argued that the plaintiff’s claims were pre-empted by 49 C.F.R. § 213.9, a
regulation promulgated under FRSA concerning maximum allowable train
speeds on different classes of track.81 The Court held that the state tort
action was pre-empted because 49 C.F.R. § 213.9, “cover[ed] the subject
matter of train speed with respect to track conditions, including the
conditions posed by grade crossings.”82
The Supreme Court’s holding in Easterwood did not address whether
FRSA’s express preemption clause could preclude a cause of action under
a federal statute, such as FELA.83 That question was instead left for lower
courts to decipher. Less than seven months after Easterwood, the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia became one of the first
lower courts to analyze whether regulations promulgated under FRSA
precluded FELA claims.84 In Earwood v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co, James
Earwood, a conductor for Norfolk Southern Railway Company, brought a

77. 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(2).
78. 507 U.S. 658 (1993), superseded on other grounds by statute, Implementing
the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-52, 121
Stat. 266, as recognized in Rhinehart v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 10-CV-86(LJV)
(LGF), 2017 WL 3500018 (Aug. 16, 2017).
79. Id. at 661, 676.
80. Id. at 661.
81. Id. at 665, 673.
82. Id. at 675; see id. at 664–65 (“To prevail on the claim that the regulations
have pre-emptive effect, petitioner must establish more than that they “touch upon” or
“relate to” that subject matter… for “covering” is a more restrictive term which
indicates that preemption will lie only if the federal regulations substantially subsume
the subject matter of the relevant state law… The term “covering” is in turn employed
within a provision that displays considerable solicitude for state law in that its express
preemption clause is both prefaced and succeeded by express saving clauses.”
(citations omitted)).
83. Id.
84. Earwood v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 845 F. Supp. 880, 885 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
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FELA claim for unsafe work conditions as a result of a crossing collision. 85
In response, Norfolk Southern argued that Earwood’s claim, as far as it
concerned excessive speed, should have been precluded based on
congressional intent expressed in FRSA’s preemption provision and the
Supreme Court’s holding in Easterwood .86 The court held that Earwood’s
FELA claim was not precluded by regulations promulgated under FRSA.87
In finding the claim was not precluded, the Court correctly determined that
Easterwood did not address FRSA’s alleged preclusive effect on FELA
claims.88 Furthermore, the Court determined that since FRSA and FELA
did not purport to cover the same areas, there was no “intolerable conflict”
between the statutes.89 Thus, Earwood’s FELA claim was not precluded
by the applicable regulation.90
While Norfolk Southern was unsuccessful in arguing FRSA
regulations could preclude FELA claims, two other United States District
Courts held otherwise. In Thirkill v. J.B. Hunt. Transp., Inc., the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama held that a FRSA
regulation regarding excessive speed precluded plaintiff’s FELA claim
insofar as the claim had to do with excessive speed.91 There, just as in
Earwood, the plaintiff asserted a FELA claim for injuries sustained as the
result of a crossing collision.92 Defendant Norfolk Southern, who was also
the defendant in Earwood, once again argued that the then-relevant FRSA
regulation and the Supreme Court’s holding in Easterwood precluded the
plaintiff’s FELA claim.93 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Alabama was persuaded by Norfolk Southern’s argument and held that
FRSA’s preemption provision precluded the plaintiff’s FELA claim on the
grounds of national uniformity.94 The court reasoned – without
explanation – that Congress’s goal of national uniformity for applicable

85. Id. at 883. In addition to the FELA claim, James Earwood also brought
common law negligence claims against the driver of the tanker truck that caused the
collision as well as the driver’s employer. Id. Additionally, the driver and company
cross-claimed against Norfolk Southern on claims of inadequate warning and
excessive train speed. Id. Furthermore, Earwood’s wife brought a loss of consortium
claim against the driver and the driver’s company. Id.
86. Id. at 883, 887, 889–90.
87. Id. at 885.
88. Id.
89. Id. (citing Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 56667 (1987)) (“Absent an intolerable or irreconcilable conflict between two statutes, a
court need not decide whether one controls over the other or whether the later one
impliedly repeals the earlier one.”).
90. Id.
91. 950 F. Supp. 1105, 1107 (N.D. Ala. 1996).
92. Id. at 1106.
93. Id. at 1106–07.
94. Id. at 1107.
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safety regulations, as expressed by FRSA’s preemption provision, applied
to railroad employees as well as non-railroad employees.95
Less than a year after Thirkill, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky also held that the FRSA excessive speed regulation
precluded the plaintiff’s FELA claim based on national uniformity
grounds in Rice v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Pacific Ry. Co.96 The Rice
court emphasized that allowing a plaintiff to argue unsafe speed under
FELA, but not under state law – as per Easterwood – would upset
Congress’s goal of national railroad safety uniformity as expressed in
FRSA’s preemption provision.97 Therefore, the plaintiff’s FELA claim
was precluded by FRSA “provided that the speed [was] in keeping with
the FRSA regulation.”98 Earwood, Thirkill, and Rice were the first cases
to deal with the issue of FELA preclusion based on FRSA’s preemption
provision. Their initial logical deductions about congressional intent and
national uniformity were key to what would follow – three circuit court
opinions that would solidify the preclusion argument for over a decade.

E. Waymire, Lane, and Nickels: FRSA’s Preemption Provision
Precludes Claims under FELA
In 2000, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit became
the first circuit to weigh in on the FRSA/FELA preclusion debate. In
Waymire v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co,99 that court held that a plaintiff’s
FELA claims alleging excessive speed and inadequate warning devices
were precluded by the applicable FRSA regulations. The Seventh Circuit
thus accepted the logic of Thirkill and Rice and extended the logic of
Easterwood.100 In Waymire, the plaintiff was a conductor involved in a
crossing collision in Muncie, Indiana.101 Waymire claimed he suffered
from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of the collision and sued
defendant Norfolk & Western for allowing the locomotive to travel at an
unsafe speed and for failing to install adequate warning devices at the
crossing where the collision occurred.102 The railroad moved for summary
judgment, arguing that its compliance with the applicable FRSA
regulations regarding speed and warning devices precluded Waymire’s

95. Id.
96. Rice v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Pac. Ry. Co., 955 F. Supp. 739, 741 (E.D.
Ky. 1997).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 218 F.3d 773, 776–77 (7th Cir. 2000).
100. See id.
101. Id. at 774.
102. Id.
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FELA claims.103 In holding that Waymire’s excessive speed claim was
precluded, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the FRSA regulations in
question “covered” the conduct alleged in Waymire’s FELA claim.104 The
court also applied this logic to Waymire’s inadequate warning devices
claim, reasoning that “[t]o allow a plaintiff to argue adequacy of warning
claims under FELA but not under state law would undermine the railroad
safety uniformity intended by Congress” and expressed in FRSA’s
preemption provision.105 Therefore, Waymire’s FELA claim was
precluded.106
Less than a year after Waymire, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit also extended the logic of Easterwood to preclude a FELA
claim alleging negligence for excessive speed in Lane v. R.A. Sims, Jr.,
Inc.107 As in Waymire, Thirkill, and Rice, the plaintiff in Lane brought a
FELA action for injuries he sustained in a crossing collision. 108 As in
Waymire, the defendant railroad moved for summary judgment, arguing
the applicable FRSA regulation for excessive speed precluded Lane’s
claim.109 On review, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the entry of summary
judgment on Lane’s FELA claim, holding it was precluded by FRSA and
its applicable regulations.110 In reaching that result, the Fifth Circuit
endorsed Waymire’s national uniformity argument, reasoning that treating
state law claims and FELA claims differently would result in FRSA
regulations becoming meaningless, since a railroad could “at one time be
in compliance with federal railroad safety standards in respect to certain
classes of plaintiffs yet be found negligent under the FELA with respect
to other classes of plaintiffs for the very same conduct.”111 The Fifth
Circuit also attacked Earwood’s conclusion that the FRSA regulations
were not directed at railroad employee safety, reasoning that FRSA’s
purpose provision explicitly stated that its purpose is “to promote safety in
every area of railroad operations and reduce railroad-related accidents
and incidents.”112
103. Id. at 775.
104. Id. at 775–76. The court also compared the conduct of the locomotive in
Easterwood with the conduct of Waymire’s locomotive. Id. The Court found that both
locomotives were operating within the 60 miles per hour speed limit prescribed by the
applicable FRSA regulation. Id. at 776.
105. Id. at 777; see 49 U.S.C. § 20106 (“Laws, regulations, and orders related to
railroad safety and laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad security shall be
nationally uniform to the extent practicable”) (emphasis added).
106. Waymire, 218 F.3d at 777.
107. Lane v. R.A. Sims, Jr., Inc., 241 F.3d 439, 443–44 (5th Cir. 2001).
108. Id. at 441.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 443–44.
111. Id. (quoting Waymire, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 955 (quotations omitted)).
112. Id. at 444 (emphasis added); 49 U.S.C. § 20101.
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In 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit joined the
Fifth and Seventh Circuits.113 Unlike the plaintiffs in Waymire and Lane,
the plaintiffs in Nickels v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., Inc. sued their
respective railroads for injuries sustained from walking on “oversized
track ballast” for an extended period of time.114 To determine whether
preclusion was merited, the Sixth Circuit asked “(1) whether a FELA
claim is precluded if the same claim would be preempted by the FRSA if
brought as a state-law negligence action; and (2) if so, whether the subject
of these plaintiffs’ claims [was] covered by a FRSA regulation.”115 The
Nickels court joined Waymire and Lane in holding that, to satisfy the
FRSA’s goal of “national uniformity” expressed in its preemption
provision, FELA actions are precluded if the same claim would be preempted if brought as a state-law action.116 Additionally, the Nickels court
held that the plaintiffs’ FELA claims for injuries caused by unsafe
walkways due to ballast size were precluded by 49 C.F.R. § 213.103,
which “covered” the topic of ballast size. 117 Therefore, the plaintiffs’
FELA claims were precluded by the applicable FRSA regulation covering
ballast.118
In the aftermath of Waymire, Lane, and Nickels, many courts applied
those decisions’ principles to determine whether FELA claims were
precluded by applicable regulations promulgated under FRSA.119 Two
113. Nickels v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., Inc., 560 F.3d 426, 432 (6th Cir.
2009).
114. Id. at 428. Track ballast consists of “stone or other material placed
underneath and around railroad tracks to provide the structural support, drainage, and
erosion protection necessary for safe rail travel.” Id.
115. Id. at 429–30.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 431–33.
118. Id. at 432.
119. See Harrison v. BNSF Ry. Co., 508 S.W.3d 331, 338–39 (Tex. App. 2014)
(holding for preclusion based on FRSA ballast regulation); Givens v. Union Pac. R.R.
Co., 28 F. Supp. 3d 854, 859 (E.D. Ark. 2014) (holding for preclusion based on
applicable FRSA safety equipment regulation); Brenner v. Consol. Rail Corp., 806 F.
Supp. 2d 786, 795–796 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (holding for preclusion in part based on FRSA
ballast regulation); Crabbe v. Consol. Rail Corp., No. 06-12622, 2007 WL 3227584,
at *6 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 1, 2007) (holding for preclusion based on FRSA ballast
regulation); Norris v. Cent. of Ga. R.R. Co., 635 S.E.2d 179 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)
(holding for preclusion based on FRSA ballast regulation); Dickerson v. Staten
Trucking, Inc, 428 F. Supp. 2d 909, 913 (E.D. Ark. 2006) (holding for preclusion
based on applicable FRSA safety equipment regulation); but see Booth v. CSX
Transp., Inc, 334 S.W.3d 897, 900–901 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011) (holding against
preclusion based on FRSA ballast regulation); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Pitts, 61 A.3d 767,
776 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2013) (holding no preclusion because FRSA ballast
regulation did not cover ballast on walkways, only ballast used for track support);
Tufariello v. Long Island R. Co., 458 F.3d 80, 86 (2d. Cir. 2006) (holding no
preclusion because no applicable FRSA regulation covered hearing protection
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other federal circuit courts, the Second and the Eighth, were also presented
with the issue of preclusion in the post–Waymire era.120 In Cowden v.
BNSF Ry. Co., the Eighth Circuit disagreed with Waymire, Lane, and
Nickels in dicta but declined to create a circuit split. 121 In Tufariello v.
Long Island R. Co., the Second Circuit punted the issue, holding that the
FRSA regulation at issue did not cover the theory of the plaintiff’s FELA
claim.122 Thus, while the Second and Eighth Circuits disagreed with the
logic of their sister circuits, the Waymire, Lane, and Nickels precedent
resulted in a steady trend of state and federal courts ruling for preclusion
when the applicable FRSA regulation covered the theory of the FELA
claim at issue.123 However, this trend was reversed after the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca Cola Co.
expanded on past Supreme Court precedent and espoused a new
framework to reconcile federal statutory conflicts.124

III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
While the Waymire, Lane, and Nickels precedent has not been
explicitly overruled by subsequent circuit court decisions or a United
States Supreme Court decision, a new framework for analyzing statutory
conflict has emerged and reshaped the preclusion argument
dramatically.125 The United States Supreme Court’s decision in POM
Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., although not directly related to the
FRSA/FELA preclusion debate, shifted the analysis of that legal question
by pronouncing key factors to consider when two federal statutes conflict
with one another .126

A. POM Wonderful v. Coca-Cola Co.: Articulating the Federal
Statutory Conflict Analysis Framework
In POM, a pomegranate juice manufacturer brought an action
against competitor Coca-Cola for false and misleading product
descriptions under the Lanham Act.127 POM argued that the misleading
claims); Grimes v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1003 (N.D. Ind.
2000) (declining to extend Waymire to conclude that any FELA claim remotely
covered by an applicable FRSA regulation is precluded).
120. See Cowden v. BNSF Ry. Co., 690 F.3d 884, 891 (8th Cir. 2012); Tufariello,
458 F.3d at 86.
121. Cowden, 690 F.3d at 891.
122. Tufariello, 458 F.3d at 86.
123. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
124. 573 U.S. 102 (2014).
125. See supra Section II.E.
126. 573 U.S. 102 (2014).
127. Id. at 105–06.
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labeling of Coca-Cola’s Minute Maid pomegranate-blueberry juice blend
resulted in a loss of sales for POM and amounted to unfair competition.128
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that POM’s Lanham
Act claim was precluded by a second federal statute, the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), which specifically forbids
misbranding food by means of misleading labeling but relegates
enforcement to the Food and Drug Administration.129 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed, holding that POM’s Lanham Act claim
was not precluded by the FDCA.130 In holding that the FDCA did not
preclude claims under the Lanham Act, the Court noted that (1) “[t]here
[was] no statutory text or established interpretive principle” to support
preclusion; (2) “nothing in the text, history, or structure of [either statute]
show[ed] a congressional [] design to forbid” Lanham Act suits; and (3)
the FDCA and Lanham Act complemented each other in the regulation of
food and beverage labels.131
As part of its analysis to determine whether the FDCA precluded
POM’s Lanham Act claim, the Court first turned to the text of each
statute.132 The Supreme Court found that “neither the Lanham Act nor the
FDCA, in express terms, forbids or limits Lanham Act claims challenging
labels that are regulated by the FDCA.”133 The Court reasoned that the
absence of any preclusion provision within the statutes was significant
because the Lanham Act and the FDCA had co-existed for seventy years,
and if Congress had concluded the two statutes where in conflict, it likely
would have enacted a provision to address the conflict within that
period.134 The Court further reasoned the absence of such a provision was
“powerful evidence that Congress did not intend FDA oversight to be the
exclusive means of proper food and beverage labeling.”135

128. Id.
129. POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 679 F.3d 1170, 1179 (9th Cir.
2012), overruled by POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 573 U.S. 102 (2014).
130. POM, 573 U.S. at 120–21.
131. Id. at 106. It is important to note that the Court discussed POM and CocaCola’s arguments for what canons of interpretation should control in resolving the
dispute. Id. at 112. POM argued for an “irreconcilable conflict” canon, arguing that
the conflicting statutes must be given their full effect unless the statutes were in
irreconcilable conflict with one another. Id. at 112 (citing Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S.
379, 395 (2009)). In response, Coca-Cola argued for an ejusdem generis canon to be
applied, asserting that the Court should reconcile conflict by letting the more specific
law (FDCA) control the more general law (the Lanham Act). Id. at 112 (citing United
States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988)).
132. POM, 573 U.S. at 106–07.
133. Id. at 113.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 114 (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 575 (2009) (quotations
omitted)).
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Next, the Court analyzed the express preemption provision added to
the FDCA in 1990.136 The Court reasoned that the express inclusion of
state laws and the noticeable absence of federal laws within the provision’s
text suggested that the FDCA was not meant “to preclude requirements
arising from other sources.”137
Afterwards, the Court turned to the structures of the Lanham Act and
the FDCA.138 The Court noted that enforcement of the FDCA was
committed to the United States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”),
while the Lanham Act mainly authorizes a cause of action for private
parties to protect their interests.139 The Court suggested that holding
against preclusion and allowing Lanham Act claims would “[take]
advantage of synergies among multiple methods of regulation…each with
its own mechanisms to enhance the protection of competitors and
consumers.”140 The Court further suggested that holding for preclusion
would ignore congressional intent, noting that it was “unlikely that
Congress intended the FDCA’s protection of health and safety to result in
less policing of misleading food and beverage labels than in competitive
markets for other products.”141
Then, the Court addressed Coca-Cola’s argument that the FDCA’s
delegation of enforcement authority to the FDA in regulating labels
showed Congress’s desire “to achieve national uniformity in labeling.”142
The Court found Coca-Cola’s argument unpersuasive, reasoning that
POM was seeking to enforce a claim under the Lanham Act rather than the
FDCA.143 Additionally, the Court reasoned that the FDCA’s promulgation
of authority under the FDA did not indicate an intent to bar enforcement
of similar violations under different federal statutes.144 The Court further
disclaimed Coca-Cola’s national uniformity argument by asserting that
preemption only applied to disputes regarding the state law claims and that
Coca-Cola’s argument in effect asked the Court “to ignore the words ‘State
or political subdivision of a State’ in the statute.”145
Finally, the Court turned to the Government’s argument that the
Lanham Act claim was precluded to the extent the FDCA or FDA
regulations specifically require or authorize the challenged aspect of [the]

136. Id.; see 21 U.S.C. § 343–1.
137. POM, 573 U.S. at 114 (citing Sester v. United States, 566 U.S. 231 (2014))
(applying principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius).
138. Id. at 115.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 115–16.
141. Id. at 116.
142. Id. at 116–17.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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label.”146 The Court rejected this argument in part because the FDCA does
“not purport to displace the remedy [under the Lanham Act] or even
implement the statute that is its source.”147 While the Court agreed that a
regulation under the FDCA could bar another legal remedy, the Court
concluded that no FDCA regulation had barred private actors from
bringing Lanham Act claims.148 Thus, the Court found that the FDCA did
not preclude POM’s Lanham Act claim.149
In sum, POM announced a number of factors lower courts should take
into consideration when undertaking a federal statutory conflict analysis:
(1) the express inclusion or absence of a preclusion provision in either
statute; (2) whether a “preemption” provision in either statute expressly
mentioned state-law claims and omitted federal law claims; (3) whether
the “text, history, or structure” of either statute show a congressional intent
to preclude claims under different federal statutes; and (4) whether the
statutes can complement one another by “[taking] advantage of synergies
among multiple methods of regulation.”150

B. Application of POM to the FRSA/FELA Conflict
While the United States Supreme Court’s holding in POM Wonderful
had nothing to do with railroads and injured railroad employees, many
state and federal courts deemed the Court’s preclusion analysis persuasive
in resolving the FRSA/FELA conflict.151 A few of the more significant
146. Id. at 118–19. The Government submitted an amicus brief on behalf of neither
party, yet still argued for partial preclusion of the Lanham Act (likely in an effort to
preserve the staying power of the applicable FDA and FDCA regulations). See Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, POM Wonderful v.
Coca-Cola Co., 573 U.S. 102 (2014) (No. 12-761), 2014 WL 827980. It is important
to note that unlike the FRSA/FELA conflict, compliance with the FDCA in POM did
not lead to a violation of the Lanham Act (thus handcuffing Coca-Cola with
inconsistent obligations). While the district court and Ninth Circuit argued that the
conduct in question was permitted by the FDCA, the Supreme Court thought
otherwise. POM, 573 U.S. at 110–11. The Court implied that while some of CocaCola’s label complied with FDCA regulations, this did not prevent Coca-Cola from
being subject to the more nuanced restrictions actionable under the Lanham Act. Id.
at 115.
147. POM, 573 U.S. at 120.
148. Id. at 120–21.
149. Id. at 121.
150. Id. at 113–17.
151. See Storey v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 18-CV-02675-MSK-MEH, 2020 WL
4805766, at *2 (D. Colo. Aug. 18, 2020) (“Indeed, in more recent years, the minority
view that the FRSA does not preempt FELA claims has begun to emerge more
forcefully, whereas the majority rule appears to have lost some traction”) (citing Guinn
v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 441 F. Supp. 3d 1319, 1333–34 (N.D. Ga. 2020); Dawson v.
BNSF Rwy. Co., 2020 WL 288847, at *11-12 (Kan. COA Jan. 21, 2020); James v.
Soo Line R.R., 2018 WL 279743, at *9 (D. Mn. Jan. 3, 2018)); Webb v. Union Pac.
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cases in the post–POM era resolving the conflict in favor of or against
preclusion are outlined below.
Less than a year after POM, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Nebraska held that FRSA and its applicable regulations did not preclude
FELA claims in any instance.152 In holding against preclusion, the court
in Madden v. Anton Antonov & AV Transportation, Inc heavily referenced
POM to conclude that applicable FRSA regulations never preclude FELA
claims.153
Using POM, the Madden court noted that FRSA’s preemption
provision, “by its plain terms,” only applied to conflicting state–law
requirements and that any other reading would force the court to “ignore
the word ‘State’ in the statute.”154 Additionally, the court concluded that
the national uniformity argument used to justify preclusion was

R.R. Co., No. 2:19-CV-04075-MDH, 2020 WL 4589713, at *6 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 10,
2020) (denying motion for summary judgment based in part on preclusion using POM
framework); Jones v. BNSF Ry. Co., 306 F. Supp. 3d 1060, 1070 (C.D. Ill. 2017) (“to
the extent that the Waymire decision is premised on the idea that allowing federal
claims about railroad safety undermines national uniformity, POM Wonderful has
displaced Waymire”); Oliveros v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. 8:14CV135, 2016 WWWL
7475663, at *2 (D. Neb. Mar. 28, 2016) (denying motion for summary judgment on
basis of preclusion in order to square procedural posture for 8th. Cir. to decide);
Meachen v. Iowa Pac. Holdings, LLC., No. 13-CV-11359-LTS, 2016 WL 7826660,
at *3–4 (D. Mass. Feb. 10, 2016) (holding FELA claims regarding maintenance of
boom truck were not precluded by FRSA, relying on congressional intent and statutory
language emphasized in POM); Madden v. Anton Antonov & AV Transp., Inc., 156
F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1021–22 (D. Neb. 2015) (rejecting Waymire and holding that FRSA
did not preclude FELA claim based in part on lack of congressional intent expressed
in POM); Henderson v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 87 F. Supp.3d 610, 621 (S.D.N.Y.
2015) (holding that FRSA regulation re: roadway worker warnings did not preclude
FELA claim based in part on failure to warn signal foreman of incoming train);
Hananburgh v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., No. 13-CV-2799, 2015 WL 1267145,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2015) (displacing Waymire’s national uniformity argument);
Bratton v. Kan. City. S. Ry. Co, No. CIV A.13-3016, 2015 WL 789127 (W.D. La.
Feb. 24, 2015) (using POM framework to hold that FELA claim based on negligent
training and certification is not precluded by the FRSA) (disagrees with Lane, but
applies the pre-POM cover analysis to reason that some FRSA regulations may still
cover the basis of the FELA claim and therefore preclude); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v.
Hartry, 837 S.E.2d 303, 572–573 (Ga. 2019) (applying POM framework to hold FRSA
and its regulations do not preclude FELA claims.); Shiple v. CSX Transp., Inc., 75
N.E.3d 1281, 1291–92 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (holding FELA claim for unlevel
walkway was not precluded by FRSA because FRSA did not “cover” walkways and
also because POM’s framework dispelled Waymire’s “national uniformity argument);
Noice v. BNSF Ry. Co., 383 P.3d 761, 769–70 (N.M. 2016) (holding that FELA claim
based on excessive-speed not precluded by FRSA, attacks Waymire line of reasoning
post-POM).
152. Madden, 156 F. Supp. 3d at 1021–22.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1020.
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unpersuasive.155 Like POM, the court noted that “disuniformity” created
by FELA claims was materially different than the “disuniformity” created
by each state enforcing a different set of railway safety regulations.156 Like
POM, the court also noted that the purposes of the statutes in conflict were
different, with FELA serving as a remedy to protect railroad employees
and FRSA designed to improve railroad safety and reduce accidents.157
The court also used POM’s framework to reason that the statutes at
issue were not in conflict, but rather complimented each other.158 The
court found that FELA claims could bring attention to potential safety
hazards that escaped the FRA’s regulatory eye, thus enhancing both the
protection of railroad employees and overall railroad safety.159 Finally,
the court addressed the intent of Congress.160 The court noted that the long
co-existence of FELA and FRSA without any amendment to FRSA
explicitly limiting FELA, combined with strong precedent against
“cut[ting] down [FELA] by inference or implication,” strongly disfavored
preclusion.161 Thus, preclusion of FELA by FRSA was unmerited in any
situation.162
In Jones v. BNSF Ry. Co., the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of Illinois went directly against its circuit’s precedent, set forth in
Waymire, and held that FRSA and its applicable regulations did not
preclude FELA claims, “even where the regulations cover the same subject
matter as claimed negligence.”163 The Jones court argued that it could
disregard Waymire under the presumption that the Supreme Court’s
holding in POM displaced Waymire.164 The Jones court first considered
the text of the two statutes in conflict.165 The court reasoned that the FRSA
preemption provision’s explicit mention of superseding state-law claims –
and express omission of federal laws – meant that Congress did not mean

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1020–21.
160. Id. at 1021–22.
161. Id. at 1021 (citing Cowden v. BNSF Ry. Co. at 892 (8th Cir. 2012)) (quoting
Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 189 (1949)).
162. Id. at 1020. In a footnote, the court noted that it was not convinced by
Waymire’s argument that inconsistent recoveries for railroad employees versus nonrailroad employees favored preclusion. Id. at 1022 n.6. The court noted that risk was
not unique to the FRSA/FELA dispute, citing the FELA’s relaxed standard of
causation as another catalyst for inconsistent recoveries. Id.
163. 306 F. Supp. 3d 1060, 1070 (C.D. Ill. 2017).
164. Id. (“[T]o the extent that the Waymire decision is premised on the idea that
allowing federal claims about railroad safety undermines national uniformity, POM
Wonderful has displaced Waymire”).
165. Id. at 1068.
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for the provision to cover FELA.166 Additionally, the co-existence of
FELA and FRSA for over forty years without amendment to either statute
expressly limiting the other – like the Lanham Act and FDCA in POM –
strongly disfavored preclusion.167
Next, the court looked at the purpose and enforcement mechanisms
of FELA and FRSA.168 The court noted the historically “liberal
construction” of FELA, coupled with the fact that preclusion would strip
claimants of their sole remedy, was persuasive in holding against
preclusion.169 Like POM, the Jones court noted that the enforcement
mechanisms of FELA and FRSA – like those of the FDCA and Lanham
Act – complemented each other and should be allowed to co-exist, thereby
“tak[ing] advantage of synergies among multiple methods of
regulation.”170 Like in Madden, the court also held that any
“disuniformity” created by allowing FELA claims was different than
“disuniformity” created by states enforcing their own set of railway safety
regulations, and thus the preemption provision should not apply.171 Like
Madden, the Jones court held that FRSA regulations never preclude FELA
claims.172
While Madden and Jones are illustrative of the majority position’s
stance on preclusion in the post-POM era, there is still a minority of
jurisdictions that find preclusion merited when an applicable FRSA
regulation covers the theory of a FELA claim.173 In Gailey v. Norfolk S.
Ry. Co., the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
held that the plaintiff’s FELA claim for injuries sustained while walking
on uneven ballast was partially precluded by an applicable FRSA
regulation on ballast.174 Noting that the Third Circuit had not addressed
the issue of the applicable ballast regulation’s preclusive effect on FELA
claims, the Gailey court turned to the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Nickels.175
The court reasoned that the applicable regulation “was intended to provide
specific guidelines for railroads to determine what type of ballast is
necessary on each track,” and thus covered ballast used for track-related
purposes.176 However, the court found that the regulation did not cover
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1068–69.
170. Id. at 1069 (quoting POM Wonderful v. Coca-Cola Co., 573 U.S. 102, 115–
116 (2014)).
171. Id. at 1069–70.
172. Id. at 1070.
173. See infra notes 175–88 and accompanying text.
174. No. 4:13-CV-2830, 2015 WL 4509071, at *5 (M.D. Pa. July 24, 2015)
(applying 49 C.F.R. §213.103 to cover the theory of the FELA claim).
175. Id. at *4.
176. Id. at *5.
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ballast used in non-track areas – such as walkways – and did not apply
preclusion to the claim insofar as it asserted negligence based on ballast in
non-track areas.177
Similarly, in Kopplin v. Wisconsin Central, Ltd., the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin held that an applicable FRSA
regulation precluded plaintiff’s FELA claim and granted the defendant
railroad summary judgment.178 In holding for preclusion, the court noted
that POM did not abrogate the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Waymire.179
The court reasoned that since POM did not “mention or involve the
FRSA/FELA regulatory scheme” and no federal circuit court had held
POM altered the preclusion analysis, POM did not abrogate or reverse
Waymire.180 Therefore, FRSA could still preclude FELA claims under
Waymire’s binding precedent.181
Finally, in Schendel v. Duluth, which involved the head-on collision
discussed in the introduction to this Note, 182 the Sixth Judicial District
Court of Minnesota held that Schendel’s FELA claim, insofar as it alleged
failure to install a proper warning signal, was precluded by the applicable
FRSA regulation.183 In its analysis the court distinguished POM from
Waymire, Lane, and Nickels.184 First, the court noted that unlike the FDCA
and the Lanham Act in POM, FELA and FRSA shared the same overall
purpose of railroad safety, “albeit from slightly different perspectives.”185
Next, the court noted that FELA was not a method of regulation, and thus
the “multiple synergies” argument from POM was not applicable to the
FRSA/FELA dispute.186 While FELA and FRSA had co-existed for many
years without any express limitation being amended into FRSA, the court
reasoned that the two statutes were not complementary and instead “work
at cross-purposes on a common set of facts.”187 Therefore, the court found
that Waymire, Lane, and Nickels had not been abrogated by POM and held
in favor of preclusion.188
177. Id. It is noteworthy that POM, although coming out a year before this opinion
was issued, was cited nowhere in the opinion and nowhere in the briefings for either
party.
178. Kopplin v. Wisconsin Cent., Ltd., No: 2016-cv-588, 2017 WL 7048811, at
*2–3 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 17, 2017).
179. Id.
180. Id. at *2.
181. Id. at *3.
182. Schendel v. Duluth, No. 69DUCV132319, 2014 WL 5365131 (D. Minn.
Sept. 29, 2014).
183. Id. at *5; see 49 C.F.R. § 236.0(c) (2020).
184. Schendel, 2014 WL 5365131, at *3–4.
185. Id. at *3.
186. Id. at *4.
187. Id.
188. Id. at *4.
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IV. DISCUSSION
Framing the issue from a railroad employee’s perspective, the
majority’ position regarding FRSA’s preclusive effect on FELA claims in
the post-POM era is encouraging. Numerous federal and state courts have
rejected the Waymire, Lane, and Nickels line of reasoning and instead
concluded that FELA and FRSA are not in conflict with one another.189
Thus, the majority of jurisdictions agree that FELA claims should never
be precluded by FRSA, even where the regulations “cover” the subject
matter of the FELA claim.190

A. Remaining Issues with the Preclusion Argument After POM
While the authority is encouraging, the issue of FRSA preclusion still
merits consideration. First, jurisdictions taking the minority position are
correct that POM did not directly overrule or abrogate Waymire, Lane, and
Nickels.191 Nor have the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits themselves
abrogated or overruled the holdings of their respective cases. The Jones
case, which was decided by the Central District of Illinois – within the
Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction – remains the only case to go directly against
its circuit court’s precedent.192 It is unlikely that the Jones court had the
ability to declare their circuit’s authority as non-binding,193 but no appeal
to the Seventh Circuit was filed. Additionally, Bratton v. Kan. City. S. Ry.
Co, decided by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana – within the Fifth Circuit’s jurisdiction – did not directly
challenge Lane.194 Therefore, plaintiffs in Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana,
Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi

189. Madden v. Anton Antonov & AV Transp., Inc., 156 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1020
(D. Neb. 2015).
190. See id.; see also supra note 151 and accompanying text.
191. “Under the prior precedent rule, [The Court of Appeals] [is] bound to follow
a prior binding precedent unless and until it is overruled by [The Court of Appeals] en
banc or by the Supreme Court.” United States v. Vega–Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1236
(11th Cir. 2008).
192. See Jones v. BNSF Ry. Co., 306 F. Supp. 3d 1060, 1070 (C.D. Ill. 2017).
193. See United States v. Spedalieri, 910 F.2d 707, 709 n.2 (10th Cir. 1990)
(noting generally that a district court must follow the precedent set by its circuit court,
regardless of the district court views concerning more favorable precedent in other
circuits).
194. No. CIV.A. 13-3016, 2015 WL 789127, at *2 (W.D. La. Feb. 24, 2015).
While the Bratton court found Madden’s application of POM to the FRSA/FELA
analysis persuasive, the court decided to reject the preclusion argument on the basis
that the applicable FRA regulation did not cover the negligent training and
certification theory of the FELA claim. Id.
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bringing FELA claims risk losing their sole avenue of recovery on the
theory of FRSA preclusion.195
Second, as illustrated by the Bratton case, some jurisdictions find
POM persuasive but nevertheless hold that FELA claims are precluded
where the FRSA regulation at issue “covers” the theory of the FELA
claim.196 Thus, plaintiffs outside the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits
might still have to battle to prove that an applicable FRSA regulation does
not cover the subject matter of their FELA claim.
Third, there are still several federal circuits which have yet to take a
stance on the preclusion issue. With the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Missouri’s recent holding in Webb v. Union Pac. R.R.
Co., which held for no preclusion but noted disagreement between
jurisdictions,197 the Eighth Circuit could be among the first of the
undecided circuits to rule on the preclusion issue in the post-POM era and
create a circuit split.
For these reasons, FRSA’s preclusive effect on FELA claims is still
a contested legal issue in need of a uniform solution. While an answer
regarding the viability of FRSA preclusion from the United States
Supreme Court or from Congress via amendment to either statute would
resolve the issue, both are unlikely to come anytime soon. 198 Therefore,
suggestions to undecided courts on how to resolve the controversy are
outlined below.

B. POM, Although It Did Not Abrogate/Overrule Waymire, Lane, and
Nickels, Suggests that the FRSA Should Never Preclude FELA Claims
While the minority position has tried to limit POM’s application to
the FDCA and the Lanham Act,199 POM should not be read so narrowly.
Many of the factors used by the United States Supreme Court to analyze
the preclusion issue in POM are directly analogous to the FRSA/FELA
dispute. Like the FDCA, FRSA has an express preemption provision that

195. See
generally
Geographic
Boundaries,
U.S.
CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/u.s._federal_courts_circuit_map_1.pdf
(last visited. June 12, 2021).
196. Bratton, 2015 WL 789127, at *1–2.
197. Webb v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 2:19-CV-04075-MDH, 2020 WL
4589713, at *3, *6 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 10, 2020) (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 20101).
198. Either course of action is unlikely because Congress has failed to amend
either statute to resolve the issue since the issue arose and the Supreme Court rejected
certiorari on Waymire and Nickels. See Waymire v. Norfolk & West. Ry. Co., 218
F.3d 773, 775 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1112 (2001); Nickels v. Grand
Trunk West. R.R., Inc., 560 F.3d 426, 428 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1147
(2010).
199. Schendel v. Duluth, No. 69DUCV132319, 2014 WL 5365131, at *3–4 (D.
Minn. Sept. 29, 2014).
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prohibits certain state law claims.200 Like the FDCA, FRSA’s express
preemption provision is silent on its effect on other federal laws.201 Like
the FDCA, enforcement of FRSA is committed to a federal regulatory
agency – the FRA – which is responsible for the enforcement of the statute
and its regulations.202 Like the Lanham Act, FELA authorizes a cause of
action for private actors – in this case railroad employees – to protect their
interests – in this case, compensation for injuries sustained as a result of
the railroads’ negligence.203 Like FDA regulations, no FRSA regulation
has expressly barred private actors from bringing claims under other
federal statutes. Like the defendants in POM, the defendants in
FRSA/FELA disputes argue that a finding against preclusion is contrary
to the congressional intent emphasizing national uniformity. 204 Like the
FDCA and the Lanham Act, FELA and FRSA have co-existed for decades
without Congress amending either statute to curtail the other.205
So, while some courts are correct that the holding in POM was
limited to resolving the FDCA/Lanham Act dispute, it would be absurd to
ignore the statutory conflict analysis the Supreme Court enumerated and
render POM meaningless in FRSA/FELA cases. Both the FDCA/Lanham
Act dispute and the FRSA/FELA dispute involved conflict between a
federal regulation promulgated by a federal regulatory agency and a longstanding federal statute.206 Therefore, POM is instructive in the
FRSA/FELA conflict analysis and should be applied to resolve these
disputes.
With POM as the applicable framework in these cases, undecided
jurisdictions going forward should adopt a position similar to Jones to hold
that FRSA does not preclude FELA claims in any instance, even where the
applicable FRSA regulations “cover” the subject matter of the FELA
claim. The “cover” standard expressed in Easterwood should be read to
apply only to cases involving preemption and not preclusion, since the
Supreme Court in POM made it clear that preemption and preclusion are

200. 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(2).
201. Id.
202. See 49 U.S.C. § 20111(a).
203. 45 U.S.C. § 51.
204. See, e.g., Def.’s Mtn. in Limine to Preclude Evidence Related to the Design
and Configuration of Def.’s Freight Cars and Locomotives, at ¶ 13, Gailey v. Norfolk
S. Ry. Co., No. 4:13-CV-2830, 2015 WL 4509071, (M.D. Pa. July 24, 2015) (No.
4:13-CV-2830), 2016 WL 3218337 (“Permitting FELA negligence actions to proceed
notwithstanding FRSA regulations that cover the same subject matter would
undermine the statutory goal that railroad safety regulation ‘be nationally uniform to
the extent practicable.’”).
205. See Madden v. Anton Antonov & AV Transp., Inc., 156 F. Supp. 3d 1011,
1021 (D. Neb. 2015).
206. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 573 U.S. 102, 112 (2014) (“Nor
does [the conflict analysis] change because an agency is involved”).
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two completely different doctrines.207
Additionally, undecided
jurisdictions should see that allowing FELA claims even where their
subject matter is “covered” by an applicable FRSA regulation actually
enhances Congress’s goal of improving railroad safety rather than
rendering FRSA meaningless. The FRA – which is responsible for
enforcement of FRSA and the regulations promulgated under it – has
limited resources to enforce violations of the applicable regulations by
railroads.208 Preserving FELA claims helps bring attention to violations
that the FRA might miss. Additionally, FELA claims help bring attention
to safety concerns that could lead to additional regulations, thus furthering
the goal of railroad safety.
Furthermore, undecided jurisdictions should look at congressional
intent surrounding FELA and precedent from the United States Supreme
Court holding that the FELA should not be “cut down by inference or
implication,”209 to find that preclusion by FRSA is not merited in any
scenario. Courts should also look to the Supreme Court’s language in Epic
Systems Corp. v. Lewis to further support a finding against preclusion.210
There, the Supreme Court reasoned that Congress’ intention to have one
federal statute preclude another must be “clear and manifest” and that there
is a strong presumption against repeals of statutes by implication. 211
Nothing in the legislative history or subsequent amendments to FELA or
FRSA shows the “clear and manifest” congressional intent for FRSA and
its regulations to limit FELA. 212 Therefore, courts should apply the
presumption against repeal by implication to find against FRSA/FELA
preclusion in all scenarios.213 Finally, undecided jurisdictions might
consider FRSA as a de facto amendment to FELA.214 In light of these

207. Id. at 111–12; see also Henderson v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 87 F. Supp.
3d 610, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“If Congress had intended that the FRSA both preclude
covered FELA claims and pre-empt covered state law claims, it would have said so.”).
208. THOMAS MCGARITY ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, THE TRUTH
ABOUT TORTS: REGULATORY PREEMPTION AT THE FEDERAL RAILROAD
ADMINISTRATION, WHITE PAPER #910, 9–15 (2009) (arguing that evidence of FRA
inspections only covering 2% of railroads’ operations each year and investigating only
13% of serious crossing collisions, combined with the exodus of high-level FRA
officials from the agency to companies they once regulated is evidence of agency
capture).
209. Henderson, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 618 (quoting Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163,
186 (1949)).
210. 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1624.
211. Id. (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)) (quotations
omitted).
212. Id.
213. Id. (quoting United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 452 (1988)).
214. Joseph M. Miller, Federal Preemption and Preclusion: Why the Federal
Railroad Safety Act Should Not Preclude the Federal Employer’s Liability Act, 51
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considerations, Waymire, Lane, and Nickels should be abandoned in favor
of the majority rule that FRSA does not preclude FELA in any
circumstance.

V. CONCLUSION
It remains to be determined whether the Eighth Circuit or any
Missouri Court will choose to adopt the post-POM standard and decline to
hold FELA claims precluded by FRSA. The precedent set by Waymire,
Lane, and Nickels stripped railroad employees of their sole remedy for
injuries sustained as a result of their employer’s negligence for over a
decade. While POM has seemingly turned the tide in the conflict analysis
to find against preclusion in an overwhelming majority of cases, precedent
within the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits still remains good law, and
district courts in those jurisdictions have struggled to reconcile POM with
the binding law in their respective circuits. Congress should act to amend
FRSA to express whether or not FELA claims should be precluded when
covered by applicable FRSA regulations. If Congress decides not to act –
which is likely considering its continued silence for the past twenty years
– the Supreme Court should grant certiorari on a case that allows it to put
the issue to bed and to expressly expand or limit the scope of the POM
holding. If no action is taken, injured railroad employees, who serve as
reliable cogs in America’s powerful railway industry machine, may
continue to be stripped of their sole remedy.

LOY. L. REV. 947, 975–78 (2005) (discussing the Urie courts treatment of LIA and
FSAA as amendments to FELA).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss3/8

28

